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TAXATION OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION: THE
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY BASES FOR
REGIONALISM WITHIN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
PHAM CHUNG,* ALBERT CHURCH,** and CHANNING KURY***

In 1975, New Mexico enacted a tax on the generation of electricity. 1 The tax of four-tenths of one mill per net kilowatt hour applied
to all persons generating electricity within the state for purpose of
sale; a credit against gross receipts tax liability was allowed for electricity consumed within the state. The act was challenged by five
public utility companies as being prohibited by federal statute 2 as
well as on other grounds. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected
the challenge, 3 but the United States Supreme Court subsequently
ruled that the Electrical Energy Tax Act was invalid. 4 The act was invalid under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution'
as imposing a discriminatory tax prohibited by Section 2121(a) of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976,6 which was a valid exercise of Congres-

sional power under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 7 Thus,
the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act of 1975 is dead. However,
the issue of taxation of electricity generation is alive since the state
of New Mexico will attempt to draft a statute that comports with the
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1. Electrical Energy Tax Act, Ch. 263, 1975 N.M. Laws 1371. This act amended what
were subsequently designated N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 7-1-6 and 62-15-28 (1978) and added
what were subsequently designated as N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 7-9-80 and 7-18-1 through
7-18-6 (1978).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976) (originally enacted as § 2121(a) of the Tax Reform Act of
1976. This provision prohibits state taxation on the generation or transmission of electricity
if the tax discriminates against out-of-state manufacturers, producers, wholesalers, retailers
or consumers of the taxed electricity).
3. Arizona Public Service Co. v. O'Chesky, 91 N.M. 485, 576 P.2d 291 (1978). See also
Case Note, New Mexico Supreme Court Upholds Validity of State ElectricalEnergy Tax, 18
NAT. RES. J. 659 (1978).
4. Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
5. U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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requirements of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, to wit a non-discriminatory tax.
For purposes of the Tax Reform Act electricity tax prohibition,
"a tax is discriminatory if it results, either directly or indirectly, in a
greater tax burden on electricity which is generated and transmitted
in interstate commerce than on electricity which is generated and
transmitted in intrastate commerce." ' The present article addresses
this issue of discrimination between interstate and intrastate sales of
electricity. The article suggests that the federal concern for economic
efficiency can be reconciled with the regional concern for equity in
the utilization of resources. The accomplishment of this reconciliation requires that New Mexico place a tax on electricity generation
without preferential tax credits to New Mexican purchasers and that
the tax rate be set high enough that the electricity purchasers compensate the public for all public costs that result from the generation
of electricity.
A PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In terms of economic theory, the imposition of a state electrical
energy tax can be an attempt to create a socially optimal rate of electricity production by adjusting the price of electricity to reflect marginal social cost. Let X, represent the electricity produced for sale
within the state and let X2 represent the electricity produced for sale
in other states. Total electrical output is:
X=X 1 + X2

(1)

The production of electricity entails costs which are not borne by
the producers and consumers of electricity. These costs are called external costs or social costs. Electricity production in New Mexico
produces social costs which include the damage to the societal interests in lands that have been stripped for coal. Social costs are also incurred in the development of cooperating inputs for electricity generation, such as the construction of mine roads when direct and
indirect tax payments are less than the public investment in the construction and maintenance of these roads. Let y represent the amount
of land ravaged by strip mining as well as the amount of development
of cooperating inputs; y is an increasing function of electricity production, X:
y = y(X), y'(X) > 0.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976).

(2)
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Suppose that under existing pollution control standards, 3 per cent
of the pollutants are required to be removed before emission, 3Z(X).
The emitted pollutants, (1 - 3) Z(X), constitute a public cost incurred by New Mexico and this cost can be incorporated into a social
welfare function for New Mexico, U1 . This function, U i , also incorporates the benefit of electricity sold within the state, X1. The
societal cost of generating electricity for both intrastate and interstate is represented by (1 - 3) Z(X 1 + X 2 ) 9 and Y(XI + X 2 ).' 0
U1 = U, [X,, (1 -3) Z(X, + X),v(x1 + X 2 )]
au,

> 0;

ax,

_U < 0;

8U1

<

(3)

0.

a

a%

The social welfare function for customers in states other than New
Mexico, U2 , is solely a function of the amount of electricity sold
outside of New Mexico, X2 . These customers do not have social welfare function components representing land and air degradation,
since they are not members of the public of New Mexico' 1 and do
not directly bear the burden of land and air degradation. The social
welfare function for these customers is:
U 2 =U

2

(X), U 2 '(X 2 ) > 0.

(4)

2

is measured by the sum of the two
The total social welfare'
(4) and (5)] 1 3
[equations
welfare
functions
social
W = W (U,,U 2 )=U, +U2 .

(5)

Electricity production requires resource inputs such as coal, labor
and amortized capital expenditures. The cost of this production, C, is
a function of the total amount of electricity produced, X, and the
control of pollution, 3Z(X). Input prices are assumed to be constant.
Total cost of production increases at an increasing rate where entrepreneurial and technological limitations are met. The total cost of
electricity production (including pollution control) is defined by:
C=C[X3Z(X)],

ac/ax > 0; ac/az > 0.

(6)

Thus, where (3a C/a Z) Z'(X) is the marginal cost of removing 0 per9. Cost in re pollution.
10. Cost in re land.
11. The reasoning here is neither tautological nor question begging. What is involved is
the interface between economic theory and the system of American government in which
states, the boundaries of which are often arbitrary but nevertheless necessary lines imposed
on resource disputes, have duties as well as interests in resource development.
12. Alternatively, the national social welfare.
13. Adding the two functions implies that individual preferences are equally weighted
regardless of geographical associations.
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cent of pollutants Z generated by the production of the marginal
unit of X, the marginal production cost, MC, is specified by:
MC = aC/ax +(OaC/az) Z'(X).

(7)

In Figure 1, total cost of production is shown as the curve AA,
where total production, X, is depicted on the horizontal axis and dollar amounts are indicated on the vertical axis. The curve AA incorporates both production costs and pollution control costs, all of which
are functions of electricity output, X. The total welfare function
[equation (6)] is shown as the curve BB. The standard theory of consumer preference suggests that the total welfare function would increase at a decreasing rate. However, the curve BB indicates net benefits in that the impact of electricity production on environmental
quality is included in the New Mexico social welfare function [equation (4)]. Environmental damage shifts the curve BB downward from
what it would be without the inclusion of the environmental impact
and may well make the curve BB turn downward at a lower level of
electricity production.
The optimal level of electricity production is the level that would
maximize net social benefits; net social benefit, 7T,is defined as' 1:
IT= W - C.

(8)

The first order conditions for maximizing 7rare obtained by setting the partial derivatives of equation (9) equal to zero:

U(X)+(l') [au, az

+

3Z

au,

axayx

y

+

-

1]

1

ai

Z

z

ax1J
(9)

U2 '(X2) +x-)

au, az + au

'
x
=0
[x
La 2
az a 2
2
Thus, economic efficiency is maintained if the price, P, is equal to
marginal social cost, which is the sum of marginal production cost,
[a_ + -Z'(X)- ,and marginal social damage,

[aY aX

1-) a)U___
Z'(X)+

az

U....
Y'(X)

aY

14. W is defined by equation (6).
C is defined by equation (7).

ax
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ax + 0 L

-

-

1--

Z'(X) +

Y'(X)]

(10)

THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT
If a purpose of an electricity generation tax is to adjust the level of
generation to reflect marginal social cost,' s then the preliminary
economic analysis has implications for the drafting of a new state tax
act. The output of electricity corresponding to a social welfare maximum in Figure 1 occurs where curves AA and BB have identical
slopes (at output X). Before the optimal level of X is reached, each
additional unit of electricity engenders net benefits since benefits
(pursuing the curve BB) are increasing faster than incremental production costs (following the curve AA). After the optimal level of X
is reached, marginal production costs exceed marginal benefits.
The optimal level of electricity generation can be achieved if the
appropriate price, P as defined by equation (11), is charged. This
price, P,is the marginal cost of production (including pollution control) ' 6 plus an adjustment factor reflecting the marginal environmental damage inflicted upon New Mexico. However, a tax credit
against gross receipt tax liability is not an economically sound means
to incorporate the environmental adjustment factor into the state tax
policy. A condition of economic efficiency or social optimality' ' of
electricity generation requires that New Mexico customers pay the
same price' ' "at the power plant" for electricity as out-of-state customers. Economic efficiency requires that the price of electricity to
both in-state and out-of-state users be identical in order that the
socially optimal amount of electricity is consumed by each customer.
A tax credit would result in a lower tax and ultimately a lower final
price for New Mexico customers which would encourage a level of
15. Marginal social damage of New Mexico consumption is defined by

F(1p)

au. az

az

ax

+

aU,. aY

a

aY

Marginal social damage imposed in New Mex-

ico by out-of-state consumption is defined by"') Ul
-Z + aY, aX'1
byI
az ax2
aY a2 ]
16. The marginal cost of production (including pollution control) would otherwise be
the theoretical basis for the price of electricity. Since the price of electricity is regulated by
the states through legislation and public utility commissions, it should not be assumed that
real prices reflect the marginal cost of production. Of course, if the electric utilities were unregulated, then prices would be higher and services more restricted.
17. See equation (11).
18. Including tax.
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FIGURE 1
Total Costs and Benefits of Electricity Production

A Total Cost of
I Production

B Total Net
Benefits of
Electricity
Consumption

Total Electricity Output

New Mexico consumption of electricity higher than the socially optimal level.1 9
There are at least two strategies to permit a transfer payment from
19. Here, the question is whether a tax credit against gross receipts tax liability is a tool
to closely align final prices for intrastate consumers with final prices for interstate consumers. The problem is resolved by recognizing that the policies of state taxation have several bases. In the case of taxation of electricity generation, there can be a policy of attempting an approach to a socially optimal level of electricity generation. On the other hand, gross
receipts taxation is a general tax directed towards having business firms share the burden of
state expenses in proportion to the volume of each firm's business (which is presumably in
proportion to the benefits that each firm receives from the state). General business taxes
vary among the states since the revenue needs and policies of the states vary. Thus, the final
prices billed to customers for electricity generated in New Mexico could properly vary
among the states.
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consumers of electricity to New Mexico in order to compensate New
Mexico for the environmental damage inflicted upon New Mexico by
electricity generation. One strategy would be for New Mexico to
negotiate a lump sum payment. While this might be done in several
ways, this strategy is probably only feasible by making the lump sum
payment a condition for licensing. A second strategy is to charge a
tax that includes compensation for the environmental degradation.
The amount of payment which should be paid can be derived in
several different ways." ° One way is depicted in Figure 2, in which
the demand for electrical energy is shown as a function of price. Dollar amounts are on the vertical axis and the amount of electricity
output is on the horizontal axis. The curve AA indicates the nonresident demand for electricity and the curve BB indicates the aggregate demand for electricity by residents of New Mexico and non-residents. The marginal social cost of generating electricity in areas other

FIGURE 2
Optimal Electricity Production

A

C Marginal social cost of electricity
produced at non-New Mexican site
D Marginal social cost of
electricity produced in New
Mexico

B

-B Aggregate Demand
-A Demand by Non-Residents

1

X

X

2

Xe

Total Electricity Output

20. The amounts would vary with alternative formulations. The present formulation
follows conventional economic theory.
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than New Mexico 2 1 is indicated as the curve CC. If the areas which
consume the electricity were to suffer the pollution created by the
electricity, X1 would be the optimal quantity of electricity produced.
However, the social cost of generating electricity in New Mexico is
22
less than generating the electricity in the prime consuming areas.
Thus, the curve CC lies above the curve DD, which represents the
marginal social cost of electricity produced in New Mexico. The economically efficient amount of electricity to be produced for consumption in both New Mexico and other states is indicated by the
intersection of the aggregate demand curve BB and the New Mexico
marginal social curve DD. That amount is X. This point is identical
to the socially optimal level of output and price derived in Figure 1
and in equation (11).
Since the generation of electricity is located in New Mexico, purchasers in other states consume more electricity, X2 , at a lower price,
P0 , than these purchasers would consume if the generation site were
located in their airsheds and political power were exercised to internalize the externalities of the generation of electricity. These benefits
of more electricity at lower price are quantified by the shaded triangle
in Figure 2.2 The area of this triangle is the measure of these purchasers' economic "willingness" 2 4 to pay for cleaner air. This "willingness" to pay is the lump sum which should be negotiated as a condition for licensing if this factor is not included within a non-discriminatory tax.
CONCLUSION
The incorporation into an electricity generation tax of factors for
regional impact meets the criterion of economic efficiency and the
federal concern for interstate commerce. The tax rate must be equal
for intrastate and interstate purchasers and the tax rate should incor21. For example, consider the placing of a large facility near Los Angeles.
22. The rich coal reserves in the Southwest constitute a relatively inexpensive energy
source and it appears to be economically feasible to transmit electricity rather than to haul
coal. Secondly, conventional economics would suggest that pollution costs are less where
there are fewer and poorer people. New Mexico is a relatively sparsely settled state that
ranks forty-eighth among the fifty states in per capita income. In the calculus of conventional economics, wealth is a factor underlying the willingness to pay for various degrees of
environmental cleanliness. However, conventional economics is simply a tool for analysis
and the authors of this article repudiate any connotation that persons of varying wealth
have correspondingly varying rights to a clean environment. The authors believe that the
environmental rights of the poor are equal to those of the wealthy, which is one of the
reasons for this article.
23. The comers of the triangle are the points (X', P'), (X2 , Po), (X' , Po).
24. Political or psychological "willingness" is distinguished.
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porate into private costs the marginal environmental damages incurred in the generation of electricity within the state.' s Lump-sum
compensation should also be considered as a possible condition for
the licensing of electricity generation facilities in order to share the
net benefits created by siting within the state.

25. The state legislature could declare in a preamble to an electricity generation tax act
that: one, the generation of electricity is detrimental to the health and welfare of the people
of New Mexico and is destructive of natural, scenic and aesthetic values of the environment
of New Mexico; two, a purpose of the tax is to provide an economic incentive to reduce the
use of electricity both within and outside of the state of New Mexico and, thus, reduce the
detrimental and destructive effects of electricity generation within the state.

